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Abstract
In keeping with the tradition of the Hypervelocity Impact Society, this paper is a written version of the keynote address I presented
at the start of 2015 Hypervelocity Impact Symposium as the recipient of the Society’s Distinguished Scientist Award. It covers the
highlights of my nearly 30 year career working in the area of hypervelocity impact phenomenology, mainly as it is applied to the
protection of humans and spacecraft that work an operate in the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 14th Hypervelocity Impact Symposium 2017.
Keywords: Spacecraft protection, MMOD, hypervelocity impact

1. Introduction
I am deeply grateful to the Hypervelocity Impact Society, its Awards Committee, and the Board of Directors for
selecting to receive the Society’s Distinguished Scientist Award at the 2015 Hypervelocity Impact Symposium
(HVIS2015). I am humbled when I read the list of the names of previous award recipients, and honored to be included
in this distinguished group.
This paper is a written version of the keynote address I presented at the start of HVIS2015. In keeping with
tradition, it covers the highlights of my nearly 30 year career working in the area of hypervelocity impact
phenomenology, mainly as it is applied to the protection of humans and spacecraft that work an operate in the
micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment. Over these past 30 or so years I have been fortunate enough
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to work with many talented and gifted graduate students, scientists, engineers, analysts, and modelers, and it is only
thanks to their keen insights and assistance that I have been able to accomplish what I have. Special acknowledgements
are due, however, to the following individuals:
 Roy Taylor and Miria Finckenor (formerly and currently at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center,
respectively), who gave my career the jump-start it needed when I was a new Assistant Professor at the University
of Alabama in Huntsville;
 Joel Williamsen (formerly at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and currently with the Institute for Defense
Analyses), who has had the burden of working with me for many of these past 30 years on a variety of topics
related to space debris;
 Dave Jerome (formerly at Eglin Air Force Base), who introduced me to DoD aspects of hypervelocity impact
phenomenologies and studies;
 Klaus Thoma, Frank Schafer, and Robin Putzar (currently at the Ernst Mach Institute), who were kind enough to
welcome me to the Fraunhofer Ernst Mach Institute for 7 months as a Humboldt Research Awardee and to give
me a much-needed break from my academic administration duties;
 Steve Scott and Mike Squire (currently at the NASA Engineering Safety Center), who have asked me to serve on
several NESC Technical Committees, thereby broadening my appreciation of the needs of NASA and its
contractors when dealing with the problem of space debris;
 Martin Ratliff (currently at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory), who introduced me to the world of robotic
spacecraft and who keeps reminding me that robotic spacecraft have different needs and requirements that human
rated spacecraft; and,
 Charlie Anderson, Lalit Chhabildas, and everyone else with whom I have had the pleasure of working as a member
of the Hypervelocity Impact Society and who also served as my mentors over the span of my career.
In looking back, it is apparent that the work that I have done has always been about increasing the safety of human
space operations. Specifically, whether through data analysis and empirical model development or through modelling
efforts that led to suggested possible modifications to ‘standard’ ballistic limit equations for thin multi-wall systems,
the primary focus of the work has always been to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenology involved in high
speed impacts so that we can better protect our astronauts and our spacecraft against the hazards and risks posed by
MMOD impacts. My career thus far can be thought of as having three phases:
 The early years, as a newly minted Assistant Professor at the UAH, when I spent a lot of time analyzing and
making sense of the reams of data that were generated at NASA/MSFC under the Phase B and C/D test programs
that supported the development the international space station,
 The middle years, when I ventured to develop analytical models of the various phenomena that occur during a
hypervelocity impact, and
 Recent years, when I have be lucky enough to a work on a much wider variety of problems, as well as serving on
several NRC/NAE and NESC technical committees.
These phases overlap, of course, and the activities and knowledge gained in one supported the activities and
exercises in the other. However, another common thread throughout my work is that I have tended to work in areas
or on topics were just outside the more mainstream activities related to high speed impact testing and spacecraft
protection. For example, while the majority of the analysis was being performed on normal impact test data obtained
using spherical aluminum projectiles, I was intrigued by and directed my energies towards the study of oblique
impacts, non-spherical, and non-aluminum projectiles. These activities naturally gave rise to studies on the kind of
hole (not simply whether or not there was a hole) in a pressure wall, what happens within a module following a
penetrating impact, and characterizing ricochet debris, among others.
In the next few sections I will attempt to summarize the more salient points that have come out of these various
studies. In order to understand the context of my work, it is important to first lay out just what exactly constituted the
mainstream of testing and analysis work in the area of hypervelocity impact and spacecraft protection in the time
period beginning with the late 1980s. It is my hope that future generations of rocket scientists will be able to continue
and expand upon these studies as we continue to unravel all the wonder and mysteries associated with these highly
energetic phenomena.
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2. Setting the stage
The near-earth space environment, where most satellites, the Shuttle, and the International Space Station orbit the
earth, is cluttered with naturally occurring micrometeoroids and pieces of man-made orbital debris. This orbital debris
ranges in size from microscopic solid propellant particles to spent rocket boosters still in earth orbit. All earth-orbiting
spacecraft are therefore susceptible to impacts by these pieces of orbital debris. Although orbital debris ceases to
become a threat for interplanetary spacecraft once they leave the confines of earth orbit, they remain susceptible to
impacts by meteoroids and other “natural debris.”
Orbital debris and meteoroid impacts can occur at extremely high speeds and can damage flight- and missioncritical systems. This can, in turn, lead to spacecraft failure and possibly loss of life. As mission time increases, the
probability that such an impact can occur also increases. Therefore, the design of all spacecraft must take into account
the possibility of such impacts and their effects on the spacecraft and on all of its exposed system components. For
this reason, extensive studies have been performed that are devoted to investigating and assessing these threats, as
well as protecting spacecraft through a variety of shielding techniques. To prevent mission failure and/or loss of life,
protection against damage by micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles is typically included in the design
of a spacecraft in the form of a hypervelocity impact shield.
Traditional damage-resistant wall design for spacecraft operating in the MMOD environment consists of a
'bumper' wall that is placed at a small distance away from the main or inner wall of the spacecraft component. This
concept was first proposed in the 1940s and is referred to as the “Whipple Shield” [1]. It has been studied extensively
in the last four decades as a means of reducing the perforation threat of hypervelocity projectiles. A sketch of a typical
dual-wall Whipple Shield is shown in Figure 1 (where a multi-layer thermal insulation blanket is shown to occupy a
position between the protective bumper and the main inner wall of the spacecraft). Such a dual-wall configuration had
been repeatedly shown to provide significant increases in protection against perforation by relatively small high-speed
projectiles over an equivalent single-wall structure.

Figure 1. Illustration of a typical dual-wall Whipple Shield

The bumper protects the spacecraft component by disintegrating the impacting particle to create one or more
diffuse debris clouds that travel towards and eventually impact the spacecraft element. However, the impacts of these
debris clouds impart a significantly lower impulsive loading to the inner wall than would an intact projectile. The area
over which this impulsive loading is distributed is governed by the manner in which the projectile and bumper
fragment, melt, or vaporize, and by the spacing between the bumper and the inner wall.

4
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Occasionally, the impact of the debris clouds could result in rarefaction stresses near the rear surface of the inner
wall that exceed the dynamic tensile fracture strength of the inner wall material. In these cases, spall fragments are
ejected further ‘inward’ at high velocities from the rear side of the inner wall. These high speed particles could
themselves inflict damage in internal spacecraft components, such as e-boxes, radiator lines, and cables.
The performance of a hypervelocity impact shield is typically characterized by its ballistic limit equation (BLE),
which defines the threshold particle size that causes perforation of, or detached spall from, the inner wall of the multiwall system as a function of velocity, impact angle, particle density, shield and inner wall thicknesses and particle
shape. These BLEs are typically drawn as lines of demarcation between regions of inner-wall perforation and no
perforation (P/NP) in two-dimensional projectile diameter-impact velocity space and when graphically represented,
are often referred to, in this form, as ballistic limit curves (BLCs).
The high-speed impact testing that provides data for the development of these BLEs and their BLCs typically use
spherical projectiles fired in light gas guns at impact velocities between 3 and 7 km/s. These data are then fitted with
scaled single-wall equations below approx. 3 km/s, and with theoretical momentum and/or energy based penetration
relationships above approx. 7 km/s to obtain three-part BLCs that cover the full range of impact velocity, that is, from
approx. 0.5 to 16 km/s for debris, and up to several tens of km/s for meteoroids. The transitional velocity region (from
approx. 3 to approx. 7 km/s for normal impacts) takes the form of a linear interpolation between the low and high
velocity regions.
Figure 2 below shows generic ballistic limit curves for a dual-wall and an equal-weight single-wall structural
system.

Figure 2. Generic dual-wall and single-wall ballistic limit curves for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts

In Figure 2, the single-wall BLE is seen to be a monotonically decreasing function as impact velocity is increased,
while the dual-wall BLE displays the traditional, well-known “bucket” shape of the three-part BLEs that have been
developed for such configurations. This shape of the dual-wall BLE is a direct result of the phenomenological changes
in response that occur at impact velocities that result in (nearly) complete projectile fragmentation (near 3 km/s for
aluminum-on-aluminum impacts) and complete projectile melt (near 7 km/s for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts).
The space between the single- and dual-wall equations is a measure of the increase in protection provided by dualwall systems over that provided by equal-weight single-wall configurations.
Reference [2] presents a history of the development of these types of BLEs. Up through the late 1980s, BLEs
such as those shown in Figure 2 were typically derived from tests under the following conditions:
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1.
2.
3.
4.

5

normal impact;
spherical aluminum projectiles;
flat unstressed aluminum plates; and,
light-weight thermal insulation blankets (if included at all).

In the early 1990s, as the international space station became a reality, the sophistication of testing programs and
analysis capabilities improved greatly. As a result, these limited test parameters and configurations evolved to include
non-normal (or oblique) impacts of non-spherical, non-aluminum projectiles impacting targets more representative of
spacecraft components (e.g. tiles, e-boxes, wire harnesses, or dual-wall systems with more complex intermediate
blankets, etc). It was at this exciting time that I entered the arena of space debris protection system analysis and design,
and was confronted with a wealth of new information that needed to be studied and analyzed.
3. Oblique impacts
In the majority of early investigations of hypervelocity impact, the trajectories of the projectiles were normal to
the surfaces of the impacted test specimens. However, it is evident that most meteoroid or space debris impacts will
not occur normal to the surfaces of a spacecraft. Unfortunately, information on oblique hypervelocity impact was
relatively scarce in the 1980s, so was difficult to assess the severity of such impacts on a candidate spacecraft wall
structural system. Furthermore, studies of oblique impact that had been performed previously typically did not discuss
the possibility of damage to external systems due to ricochet debris particles. To increase the understanding of
phenomena associated with oblique hypervelocity impact, light gas gun tests conducted at NASA in the late 1980s
and early 1990s began to include more non-normal impact firings to generate (and to subsequently analyze) oblique
hypervelocity impact test data.
Figure 3 shows a sketch of the dual-wall test configuration (without any intervening MLI), while Figure 4 shows
the formation of penetration and ricochet debris clouds in a 45-deg impact [3].

Figure 3. Dual-wall test configuration

6
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Figure 4. Formation of ricochet and penetration debris clouds, v~6 km/s, θ=45-deg, ts/dp~3 (from [3])

Figures 5-8 show typical changes in the damage morphology that is sustained by pressure walls as the impact
obliquity is increased [4]. The specific tests shown in Figure 5-8 were performed at impact velocities of ~7 km/s using
7.95 mm diameter aluminum projectiles. The bumper, pressure wall, and ricochet witness plates were made of 6061T6, 2219-T87, and 2219-T6 aluminum, respectively. Their thicknesses were held constant at 1.6, 3.175, and 2.54 mm,
respectively. These figures also show the damage sustained by the ricochet witness plates in each of those tests.

Figure 5. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 30-deg impact (from [4])

Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000
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Figure 6. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 45-deg impact (from [4])

Figure 7. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 60-deg impact (from [4])

Figure 8. Damaged pressure wall and ricochet witness plate, 75-deg impact (from [4])
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It quickly became evident from these and other follow-on tests that the damage potential of ricochet debris could
be quite high, especially for very high obliquity impacts. It was also found in these studies that beyond a certain critical
impact angle, the in-line penetrating debris cloud no longer followed close to the original impact trajectory, but rather
began to bend back towards the normal between the bumper and the pressure wall. It was also beyond this critical
angle that particle damage to the ricochet witness plate became quite substantial. This critical angle was estimated to
have a value of 60-deg to 65-deg.
All ricochet debris poses a threat to external spacecraft components that lie in its path. However, the threat could
be very significant in the case of highly oblique impacts, which, from Figures 7 and 8, can be surmised to produce
debris clouds with relatively large ricocheting particles. An empirical model was developed to characterize the ricochet
ejecta particles that would be created by a high speed impact on a typical bumper plate [5]. Specifically, the model
developed predicts the spread and trajectory of ricochet debris particles created in a hypervelocity impact as well as
the size and velocity of the most damage particle in the ricochet debris cloud.
The table in Figure 9 presents a comparison between the average ricochet debris particle diameters and velocities
calculated in a previous experimental study and the average particle velocities and diameters calculated using the
empirical model. As can be seen from this figure, the average diameter values predicted by the equations developed
in this study compare favorably with those calculated previously. However, the average velocity values predicted by
the model are approximately twice the values reported previously.

Figure 9. Comparison of average empirical and predicted ricochet particle diameters and velocities
(Reference [6] in [5] same as [6] in this paper).

4. Use of composite materials
As mentioned previously, the traditional approach to mitigating the damage that would be caused by high-speed
on-orbit MMOD impacts consists of placing one or more “bumper” shields small distances away from the primary
load-bearing “inner wall” of the spacecraft. Behind the inner wall of such a multi-wall system, as in the case of the
International Space Station, for example, are located the equipment racks, crew quarters, science experiment hardware,
etc. With the advent of many new high-strength composite materials and their proliferation in aerospace applications,
it quickly became evident that it was necessary to evaluate their potential for use as part of a multi-wall configuration
in long-duration space and aerospace structural systems such as the international space station.
Furthermore, most satellites launched into Earth orbit are constructed with honeycomb sandwich panels as their
primary structural load bearing elements without a bumper shield because design, cost, and / or mission constraints
prevent the inclusion of a protective shield. In these cases, the load-bearing honeycomb sandwich panels (HC/SPs)
also serve as the protection systems for the spacecraft components that are located behind them, such as electronics,
avionics, fuel cells, pressure vessels, etc. In both cases it is important to know whether or not the impacting particle
(or its remnants) will exit the rear of a spacecraft wall system, whether it is a “Whipple-type” multi-wall system or a
“single” HC/SP wall.
References [7,8] contain a historical overview of the high-speed impact testing of composite material panels and
HC/SPs. Not surprisingly, the extent of the effort to study composite material and composite structural systems such
as HC/SP panels has been much more limited than the effort exerted in the study of metallic (mostly aluminum) multi-
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wall systems under similar impact conditions. For example, a review of the papers presented at the International
Ballistics Symposia (published by the host organization) and the Hypervelocity Impact Symposia (published by
Elsevier) allows us to construct the histogram shown in Figure 10. Also shown in Figure 10 is an accounting of papers
on this topic appearing in other venues and journals. As can be seen in Figure 10, interest in this area of research is
increasing, especially since the 1990s.

Figure 10. Number of papers on composite and HC/SP HVI

My early work in this area explored changes in the level of protection that would be afforded to a spacecraft if
composite materials were used either as bumpers, stuffing, or as pressure walls. More recent work focused on
characterizing impact response of HC/SPs under hypervelocity impacts. The following paragraphs summarize the
main conclusions reached in these studies. Additional more detailed information on the use of composite materials in
multi-wall systems or on the response of HC/SPs under high-speed impact can be found in References [9] and [10],
respectively.
4.1. Composite outer bumpers
The response of dual-wall systems with Kevlar and graphite/epoxy (Gr/Ep) outer bumpers was compared against
that of equal-weight all-aluminum dual-wall systems in the late 1980s by Schonberg [11]. The aluminum bumpers
were more effective in spreading out the debris created by the initial impact on the bumper than were the Kevlar
bumpers. Apparently the interaction of the shock waves in the projectile and the Kevlar bumpers prevented complete
break-up of the projectiles, which decreased the dispersion of debris cloud fragments, thereby increasing the likelihood
of pressure wall perforation. However, the pressure wall damage areas in dual-wall systems with Gr/Ep bumpers more
wide-spread than those in equivalent systems with Kevlar bumpers. Pressure wall perforations in Gr/Ep systems
consisted of several small holes, not one large hole as in the Kevlar systems. From these results, it was concluded that
using a laminated composite as the outer bumper in a dual-wall system does not offer any protection advantage as
compared to the protection level provided by an all-aluminum dual-wall system.

Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000
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Figure 11a,b. Graphite/epoxy bumper and aluminum pressure
wall plate (from [11])
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Figure 12a,b. Aluminum bumper and aluminum pressure wall
plate (from [11])

Figures 11a,b and 12a,b show the damage sustained by systems with Gr/Ep bumpers and aluminum pressure wall
plates and that in corresponding systems with aluminum bumpers and aluminum pressure wall plates under very
similar high speed impact conditions. As expected, there is significant peeling of the outer layers in the Gr/Ep bumper,
on the front and rear surfaces. The nature of the hole in the pressure wall plate in the test with the Gr/Ep bumper also
indicates that the projectile passed through the bumper nearly intact. This is in sharp contrast to the evidence of the
pressure wall plate in the test with the aluminum bumper. In this case the diffuse damage area on the pressure wall
shows that the projectile was substantially broken up by the aluminum bumper.
These results were supported by Christiansen [12], who performed an in-depth study in the early 1980s to evaluate
the effectiveness of metallic, composite, and ceramic materials as MOD shields. Christiansen found that while Gr/Ep
alone did not shield as well as did aluminum, it had some potential to enhance MOD protection levels when used as
the second bumper in a double-bumper system with an aluminum outer bumper. The use of composite materials as
inner bumpers is discussed in the next section.
4.2. Composite inner bumpers
The response of triple-wall systems with Kevlar and Spectra inner bumpers was compared against that of allmetallic triple-wall systems [13]. In nearly all the Kevlar inner bumper tests the Kevlar panels were not perforated,
whereas their aluminum counterparts sustained large holes. In the Spectra tests, both the Spectra and aluminum inner
bumpers were perforated. However, the pressure walls in the Spectra systems sustained little or no damage, while
those in corresponding all-aluminum systems were usually perforated. These results demonstrate that using a
composite material as the inner bumper does increase the protection afforded to a spacecraft against damage caused
by MMOD impacts.
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Figures 13a,b and 14a,b show the damage sustained by systems with Spectra inner bumpers and aluminum
pressure wall plates and that in corresponding systems with aluminum inner bumpers and aluminum pressure wall
plates under nearly identical impact conditions. The pressure wall in the system with the Spectra inner bumper is
barely damaged while that in the all-aluminum system sustained (as is more typical) a much wider area of damage
(and in this case even a small perforation).

Figure 13a,b. Spectra inner bumper and aluminum pressure
wall plate (from [13])

Figure 14a,b. Aluminum inner bumper and pressure wall
plate (from [13])

As summarized in Reference [14], the results of the various test programs performed showed that multi-wall
systems involving composite material bumpers in combination with aluminum bumpers produced less damaging
secondary debris or ejecta, and were
 more efficient in converting the projectile’s kinetic energy into internal thermal energy,
 less sensitive to projectile shape, and
 less sensitive to the obliquity of the impacting projectile.
Furthermore, such hybrid systems resulted in less cumulative damage to the pressure wall of the multi-wall system
when compared with traditional Whipple-type all-aluminum single-bumper systems [15]. As a result, such systems
were found to provide better protection against more hazardous non-spherical projectiles when compared to the
protection level offered by all-aluminum systems [16].

Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000
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4.3. Composite pressure walls
In the mid-1990s, a study was performed to compare the response of dual-wall systems with Graphite/Epoxy
(Gr/Ep) pressure walls against that of equal-weight all-aluminum dual-wall systems [17]. The results showed there
are several advantages of using Gr/Ep as a pressure wall material: (1) it eliminates severe cracking and petalling
sustained by aluminum walls in systems impacted by large projectiles; (2) its ballistic performance is superior to that
of aluminum for impact velocities above 5.5 km/s; and (3) patching a hole in a perforated Gr/Ep panel, even if it were
larger than in an aluminum panel, would be relatively easy since the Gr/Ep remains non-deformed and the patch can
be, e.g., adhesively bonded. Repairing a perforated aluminum wall would be a more difficult procedure since the
aluminum would likely be cracked and petalled. On-orbit repair of perforated aluminum panels would therefore
require cutting and welding tools that are EVA compatible, while the repair of perforated Gr/Ep panels would not.

Figure 15. Comparison of graphite/epoxy and aluminum pressure walls (table and figure from [17])

Figure 15 shows a summary of the test results for similar systems with Gr/Ep and aluminum pressure wall. As
can be seen from this figure, the ballistic resistance of these two systems was similar below approx. 5.5 km/s; above
that velocity, there began to be some differences in response.
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4.4. Response of HC/SPs
Initial testing of HC/SPs in the 1960s and 1970s produced mixed results and inconsistent predictions regarding
the ability of such systems to withstand hypervelocity MMOD impacts. High speed impact testing of HC/SPs
experienced a resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s when an increasing number of satellites were being
designed with HCSPs as the main load-bearing structural elements and subsequently subjected to potential impacts
by man-made debris in earth orbit. Test programs performed in support of these satellite design and construction
activities considered not just the impact of the HC/SP, but also what would be the effects of penetrating high speed
impacts on the satellite systems behind the HC/SP (e.g. fuel pipes, heat pipes, pressure vessels, electronics boxes,
harnesses, and batteries).

Figures 16a,b. Prediction of HC/SP perforations (from [20])
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One outcome of these spacecraft component vulnerability studies was a new BLE that could be applied to various
structural configurations, including single wall systems, dual-wall systems, multi-wall systems with HC/SPs, batteries,
e-boxes, harnesses, etc. [18,19]. To assess how well these BLEs performed in terms of predicting perforation (P) or
non-perforation (NP) of HC/SP systems with aluminum and composite face-sheets, an exercise was undertaken to
compare the P/NP predictions of the equations in [18] and in [19] against actual P/NP occurrences as found in the data
from the experimental investigations discussed in this section [20]. It was found that these BLEs are fairly
conservative: they successfully predicted HC/SP perforation in nearly all of the tests that resulted in perforation, while
allowing approximately half of the non-perforating tests to be incorrectly labeled as tests with a perforation (see
Figures 16a,b for perforation prediction of HC/SPs with aluminum and composite face-sheets, respectively). This
indicates the likelihood that use of these BLEs in design applications could result in overly robust shielding hardware.
In addition to knowing whether or not the impacting particle (or its remnants) will exit the rear of the HC/SP, it is
equally important to know, if indeed the ballistic limit of the HC/SP has been exceeded, where the debris created in
such an impact will land and what internal components it will strike (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Debris from a perforating impact striking interior spacecraft components

To help address this issue, a system of empirical equations that can be used to predict the trajectories and spread
of the debris clouds that exit the rear face-sheet following a high speed perforating impact of a HC/SP was recently
developed [21]. The equations developed in this study incorporate the following features:
 presence (or the lack thereof) and composition of a multi-layer thermal insulation (MLI) blanket on the
exterior of the HC/SP;
 material composition of the HC/SP face-sheets (either aluminum or a carbon-fiber-reinforced polymer, or
CFRP);
 face-sheet thicknesses and overall HC/SP thickness;
 HC core properties (core size, wall thickness, and material);
 the ballistic limit of the HC/SP (see Figure 18), and;
 projectile diameter, material, impact velocity, and trajectory obliquity.
Empirical equations were also developed to predict the dimensions of the holes in the front and rear HC/SP facesheets. These hole dimension equations can be used to calculate the amount of mass in a debris cloud if the HC/SP is
perforated by a high speed impact. The trajectory angles can then be used to determine where this mass will travel and
what spacecraft components will be impacted, and the spread angles equations will determine the extent of the
footprint made by this mass on any encountered surface. All of this information can then be fed into a risk assessment
code to calculate the probability of spacecraft failure under a prescribed set of impact conditions.
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Figure 18. Difference between “simple” and “BL-based” empirical equations

5. Non-spherical projectiles
As a practical matter, most of the BLEs in use have been constructed from impact test databases involving only
spherical projectiles. When using spherical projectile, impact orientation is a non-issue. When using cylindrical,
chunky, or disk projectile, the orientation of the projectile upon impact on the bumper plays a crucial role in
determining the subsequent response of the pressure wall. Figure 19 shows a rather unusual perforation morphology
following the (presumed) normal impact of an L/D=1 cylindrical projectile [22].

Figure 19. Hole in Pressure Wall Plate of a Dual-Wall System following the Normal Impact of a Cylindrical Projectile.

Morrison [23], Piekutowski [24], and others have shown that non-spherical projectiles can be more damaging than
equal mass spherical projectiles under the same impact conditions. In the case of rod-like projectiles, this is mostly
due to the incomplete fragmentation of the incoming projectile by the bumper. The intact portion of the projectile is
clearly evident in Figure 20, which shows a frame from the numerical simulation of an L/D=2 projectile on a dualwall system [25].
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Figure 20a,b. Numerical Simulation of an L/D=2 Cylinder Impacting a Dual-Wall System

Of course, spheres are not expected to be a common shape for orbital debris; rather, orbital debris fragments might
be better represented by other regular or irregular solids. A study was performed to develop BLEs and their
corresponding curves (BLCs) for a typical dual-wall configuration impacted by a variety of non-spherical projectiles
[26]. Figure 21 shows the projectile shapes that were considered in that study. The responses of the dual-wall system
to impacts by the projectiles shown in Figure 17 were obtained using the AUTODYN software package.

Figure 21. Projectile Shapes Used in BLE Development Study

For each shape, impact simulations were conducted at velocities ranging from 1 to 15 km/s. Projectile mass was
increased to a point where the projectile (or ensuing debris cloud) was able to perforate the rear wall. BLCs were then
drawn between regions of rear-wall perforation and no-perforation in 2-D projectile mass-impact velocity space. In
order to make the various non-spherical projectile BLCs comparable to the spherical projectile-based curves, the nonspherical projectiles mass–impact velocity curves were converted into equivalent spherical diameter–impact velocity
curves using an equal mass consideration. Equivalent spherical projectile diameters were calculated by equating the
volume of a sphere to the volume of the projectile being considered and then by solving the sphere’s diameter. Figure
22 shows the resulting family of BLCs for the non-spherical projectiles considered, as well as for a sphere.
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Figure 22. Numerically-based Ballistic Limit Curves for Non-Spherical Projectiles

As expected, the short or chunky projectiles (sphere and face-on cube impact) had the least perforating ability,
while those of the longest solid projectiles (cylinder and cone) were the highest. The implication of these results is
that if a spacecraft wall system were designed using spherical projectile-based BLCs, the design could be highly nonconservative and possibly unsafe.
It is also important to note that that the BLCs in Figure 22 were drawn in terms of equivalent spherical projectile
diameter as a function of impact velocity. However, in order to be useful for spacecraft design, BLCs need to be
presented in units that are consistent with environment flux models used in that design process. Current orbital debris
re-entry models use a single one-dimensional characteristic length that is effectively a radar cross-section (RCS)
diameter. BLCs that are presented in a format that employs a characteristic length instead of an equivalent spherical
diameter are likely to be more consistent with orbital debris environment predictions, and should find greater utility
in spacecraft risk assessment and design.

Radar Cross Section Diameter (cm)

1.6
1.4
1.2

Sphere
Long Cylinder

1

Short Cylinder
Long Disk
Short Disk

0.8

Long Cone Disk
Short Cone Disk

0.6

Long Solid Cone
Short Solid Cone
Cube Face-on

0.4

Cube Edge-on
Cube Point-on

0.2
0
0

2

4

6
8
10
Impact Velocity (km/s)

12

Figure 23. Non-Spherical Projectile BLCs Re-Cast using RCS

14

16

18

William P. Schonberg / Procedia Engineering 204 (2017) 4–42
Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000

21

In a follow-on study [27], the BLCs in Figure 22 were re-cast using an RCS diameter as the characteristic length.
The recast BLCs were found to be more tightly grouped, and were not as spread out as they were when simply plotted
using equivalent spherical projectile diameter (see Figure 23). As a result, the effect of projectile shape on penetrating
ability was shown to be somewhat reduced when using characteristic length as opposed to equivalent mass for
comparison purposes.
One of the major conclusions of this study was that, at least from an RCS characteristic length perspective, the
spherical projectile is not necessarily the least conservative projectile shape on which to base or develop a BLC for a
multi-wall system. This was in stark contrast with the then-prevailing wisdom which presumed that spherical
projectiles are the least damaging of all shapes.
The need for a more realistic projectile size and shape in risk assessments was revisited in two recent studies on
the susceptibility of dual-wall structures [28] and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to MMOD impacts [29].
For the purposes of performing penetration risk analyses, NASA currently assumes that the shape of the impacting
orbital debris particle is a sphere, with a diameter equal to the particle characteristic length. A number of different
ground-based experiments have generated mass distributions for typical orbital debris fragments that could be
expected to impact spacecraft. These tests have also shown that the much smaller fragments tend to be chunkier or
more ‘cube-like’, while the larger fragments are more flake-like, and being to resemble potato-chips in shape.
The mass distribution from such tests are plotted versus their measured characteristic length (LC) in Figures 24ad. Also plotted in each figure are the mass values for spheres having the characteristics lengths as diameters (the red
lines). It is apparent in these figures that the masses of spheres with diameters equal to LC values above the “crossing
points” are higher than the masses of the corresponding actual fragments at those characteristic lengths.

Fig. 5. Comparing mass of satellite fragments to aluminum spheres,
Original SOCIT data (Reynolds et al., 1998).

Figure 24a-d. Comparison of Satellite Fragment Masses to Aluminum Sphere Equivalents (from [29])

As such, when LC exceeds the “crossing point” value, the realistic (i.e. non-spherical) debris fragments are less
penetrating than currently assumed, an assumption which in turn currently leads to an over-prediction of risk.
Offsetting this to some degree, however, is the simplifying presumption of shape – as seen before, for a given mass,
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non-spherical particle shapes can be more penetrating than a sphere. An actual orbital debris fragment, therefore, can
be either more or less penetrating than that being estimated by the solid sphere of the same ‘size’ (i.e., by taking
characteristic length equal to spherical diameter), depending on which of these two effects dominates. The fragment
will be less penetrating because of the smaller mass, but may be more penetrating because of the irregular shape.
This study also showed that, after taking all these competing issues into considerations, continuing to use
aluminum spheres in spacecraft risk assessments could result in assessed risk values that might be higher by a factor
of 2 than those obtained if more realistic projectile shapes were used. In such a case, there could be an over-design of
a spacecraft’s MMOD protection systems, and the spacecraft would be heavier than needed, cost more to construct
than needed, and cost more to put into orbit than needed. This study demonstrated the need to incorporate effects of
mass and shape in mission risk assessment prior to first flight of any spacecraft as well as the need to continue to
develop/refine BLEs so that they more accurately reflect the shape and material density variations inherent to the
actual debris environment. The result of such activities would be spacecraft design and risk assessment processes that
include more appropriate models of spacecraft response when threatened by the orbital debris environment.
Of course, the question naturally arises regarding just which BLE to use to assess the effect of an impact of a nonspherical projectile on a target structure. After all, a flake-like debris particle or a cube-like particle can impact a target
at any number of different orientations, and each orientation has its own BLE. Therefore, in addition to the shape of
the impacting particle, the orientation of the particle at the time of impact is of great importance to its penetrating
ability. Note from Figures 22 and 23 that the impact of the cube at different orientations produces a wide variation in
ballistic limit. As a result, it is important to consider the likelihood of each type of particle shape and impact orientation
when performing an overall risk assessment of a spacecraft.
The likelihood of different shapes could be determined from a variety of sources, including ground-based tests,
radar cross section measurements of satellite debris, and ground-based modeling of breakup events using hydrocodes
or other means. The likelihood of different orientations and the effect on overall ballistic limit can be calculated using
a method similar to that used in aircraft survivability analyses. In this approach, a regular solid (like a cube), can be
broken into 26 views spaced at 45 degrees from one another (see Figure 25). In the case of a cube, six of the views
(23%) result in a view of the cube face, 12 of the views (46%) result in a view of the cube edge, and 8 of the views
(31%) result in a view of the cube corner.

Figure 25. Impact Trajectory “Views” for a Cube

By treating these views as particle orientations coincident with the velocity vector, a weighted ballistic limit curve
can be derived from individual hydrocode ballistic limit predictions for each view (or orientation). Figure 26 shows
such an orientation-weighted ballistic limit curve for the cube shape
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Figure 26. Original and Orientation-Weighted Ballistic Limit Curves for a Cube

6. Post-impact response characteristics
In some cases, it is equally important to know, not only whether or not a module or wall perforation will occur, but
also what might be the effects of such a perforation after some time has elapsed. Of particular interest in the
development of habitable spacecraft such as the international space station are the issues of late-stage structural
vibrations that might result from air rushing out of a perforated module and the effects of a module perforation on its
inhabitants (e.g. pressure loss, etc).
6.1 Late-stage Structural Vibrations
The perforation of a habitable module that is part of a habitable space structure in earth orbit by an orbital debris
particle will result in a thrust normal to the module surface. The thrust is caused by air exhausting through the
hole in the module wall created by the impact. A study was performed to examine the ensuing global dynamic
response of the Space Station Freedom following such a module rupture, assuming that structural integrity would be
maintained [30]. Several impact situations were considered. In each situation, the objective was to predict a worstcase response scenario. Figures 27a-c illustrate the various impact scenarios considered.

Figure 27a-c Impact Scenarios Considered in Vibration Study (from [30])
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After a module wall is perforated, a thrust is generated as the pressurized air in the modules discharges into the
near-zero ambient pressure space environment. This thrust is the forcing function used in the solutions of the equations
of motion. Thrust histories for hole diameters of 2.5, 5, 10 and 15 cm are presented in Figures 28a,b.

Figure 28a,b. Thrust Histories for Four Hole Diameters

The maximum vibration displacements we calculated were, admittedly, a bit smaller than we had thought would
occur. However, the mass of the modules, approx. 148,860 kg, is considerable; their weight on earth is approx. 1.46
MN. The maximum calculated force value of 1472 N was quite small when compared with the weight of the clusters.
Based on the results obtained, it appears that the vibration amplitudes will not compromise the structural integrity of
the space station. The maximum calculated deflections following a perforating orbital debris particle impact are
small (less than approx. 1.7 m) when compared to the length of the SSF from the modules to solar arrays (approx.
60 m). These findings indicate that, in the event of a module wall rupture, the survivability limitation may be a humanrelated factor rather than a space-station-related factor. For example, the rapid rate of de-pressurization would be
serious issue, and the ability of the crew to isolate the damaged module would be critical.
6.2 Internal effects
The issue of what happens ‘inside’ a pressurized module following an orbital debris impact was initial considered
during the Apollo program [31,32]. The issue naturally arose again during the design of the space station, only this
time the habitable, pressurized volume of the station module cluster was significantly larger than that of the command
module.
In an attempt to address this issue, a first-principles-based model was developed to predict the effect of a
perforating orbital debris particle impact on the pressure and temperature within a pressurized habitable spacecraft
module [33]. The model was developed such that it sequentially characterized the phenomena comprising the impact
event, beginning with the initial impact on the outer module wall, the creation and motion of a debris cloud within the
module wall system, and the impact of the debris cloud on the inner module wall. The final phase of the model was
concerned with the creation and motion of the debris cloud that enters the module interior and its effect within the
module on module pressure and temperature levels. This characterization is accomplished through the application of
elementary shock physics theory and fundamental thermodynamic principles. Figure 29 shows a sketch of the pressure
attenuation for the internal debris cloud.
The predictions of the analytical model are compared with experimental pressure and temperature data from a
series of instrumented high-speed impact tests. Figure 30 shows the experimental set-up and the locations of the
pressure and temperature sensors within the test chamber of the light gas gun facility that was used in the experimental
program.
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Figure 29. Internal Debris Cloud Parameters and Pressure Attenuation Model
Figure 29. Pressure attenuation inside the debris cloud.

Figure 30. Pressure and Temperature Sensor Locations

Several modifications are made to the basic model to bring its predictions closer in line with the experimental
results. For example, it appeared that the pressure was attenuated too rapidly by the original model, so a semi-empirical
function was introduced that would ‘stretch out’ the attenuation of the pressure behind the penetrated pressure wall
plate. Following the introduction of this function and the adjustment of several empirical constants, the predictions of
the modified internal effects model are shown to be in close agreement with the experimental results. Table 1 shows
a comparison of experimentally obtained pressure and temperature values at the locations indicated in Figure 30 and
the predictions of the model developed in this study.
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Table 1 Pressure and temperature prediction comparisons

Sensor
1E
1W
2E
2W
3E
3W
1E
1W
2E
2W
3E
3W
1E
1W
2E
2W
3E
3W
1E
1W
2E
2W
3E
3W

Pressure Increase
Temperature Increase
Experimental
Model
Experimental
Model
Result (psi)
Prediction (psi) Result (deg-C) Prediction (deg-C)
Test 1
17
15.2
18
43.2
18
15.2
27
43.2
4
7.2
23
23.0
6
7.2
20
23.0
3
3.2
25
11.6
2
3.2
n/a
11.6
Test 3
21
24.3
104
63.9
21
24.3
118
63.9
17
17.2
139
46.6
21
17.2
94
46.6
8
8.0
n/a
25.1
8
8.0
40
39.0
Test 5
34
34.2
64
82.7
40
34.2
54
82.7
10
10.2
34
30.0
15
10.2
31
30.0
3
5.6
n/a
18.2
4
5.6
n/a
21.5
Test 6
16
24.6
20
64.8
31
24.6
65
64.8
15
17.8
52
48.1
14
17.8
63
48.1
12
8.3
44
25.8
7
8.3
n/a
40.1

7. Impact damage characterization
In addition to being able to predict whether or not an impact will penetrate or cause critical failure of a spacecraft
wall, it is also important to be able to predict the nature and extent of the penetration. Specifically, in the case of a
Whipple Shield, what is the size of the hole in the pressure wall? Will it be a cookie-cutter type hole, or a bulged hole
with petals accompanied by cracking? And if the latter, what is the maximum extent of the cracking? While a remote
possibility, if penetration-induced cracking were to occur on-orbit, unstable crack growth could develop which could
lead to an unzipping of an impacted module.
A series of studies was performed to develop empirical models of effective hole size and maximum tip-to-tip
crack length for some of the multi-wall systems being developed for the international space station. The significance
of the work performed is that those models could be incorporated directly into a survivability analysis to determine
whether or not module unzipping would occur under a specific set of impact conditions. The prediction of hole size
can also be used as part of a survivability analysis to determine the time available for module evacuation prior to the
onset of incapacitation due to air loss.
Early work employed rudimentary empirical curve fits of the space station Phase B and Phase C/D test data [34].
This initial work developed equations that included a variety of the geometric parameters that define a dual-wall
configuration with an internal MLI blanket. Subsequent efforts focused on specific wall constructions being
considered for the international space station [35]. Pressure wall hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack equations
developed in this study were of the form shown in the following equation:
X = Af(θp)g(Vp)[1- e-C(Mp/MBL -1)]

(1)

where X is either hole diameter or maximum tip-to-tip crack length, respectively. In equation (1), V p, Mp and θp are
the velocity, mass and obliquity of the impacting projectile while M BL is the ballistic limit mass at a velocity of interest
for the particular system under consideration under a θ p-degree impact. The use of projectile mass and ballistic limit
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mass in equation (1) allows us to pool together the data obtained using different types of launchers. This form was
chosen because (1) when using this form both hole diameter and crack length approach zero when the projectile
diameter approaches the ballistic limit diameter value from above, and (2) these forms adequately represent the initial
growth stage of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length as the projectile diameter increases just beyond
the ballistic limit diameters.
Figure 31 shows a comparison of the predictions of the empirical equations for maximum tip-to-tip crack length
for the baseline construction of the US Lab module (i.e. Whipple Shield + MLI) and for the enhanced US Lab module
wall construction (i.e. Whipple Shield + Nextel/Kevlar ‘stuffing’).

Figure 31. Comparison of Maximum Tip-to-Tip Crack Length for Enhanced and Baseline (Unenhanced) US Lab Module (Normal Impact)

The following points are evident from this figure.
1. The enhanced systems have much higher ballistic limits than baseline systems.
2. The initial slopes of the enhanced system curves are steeper than those of the baseline systems.
3. The asymptotic values of the enhanced system curves are much higher than those of the baseline systems.
These results indicate that enhanced systems, while more resistant to perforation than baseline systems, will
sustain much larger cracks (and holes) – if they occur – than corresponding baseline systems, and will reach those
higher values quicker. This conclusion can have serious implications when factored into risk assessments for
spacecraft modules using walls of similar construction (see also [36]).
In order to be able to assess whether or not unstable crack growth could develop (leading to possible module
unzipping), it is first necessary to determine whether either petalling or cracking would even occur in the event of a
module perforation. A study was performed to develop an empirical model that could be used to answer this question,
that is, if a pressure wall were perforated, would the perforation be in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter
hole? The resulting model was a petalling limit function (PLF) that predicts the onset of petalling in terms of impact
conditions and spacecraft wall system geometry [37]. In a sense, it is analogous to the ballistic limit equation (BLE)
that predicts the onset of pressure wall failure or perforation in terms of the same parameters.
Figures 32a,b and 33a,b show plots of the ballistic limit equation (BLE) and petalling limit function (PLF) for these
two baseline lab cylinder (BLC) and enhanced lab cylinder (ELC) wall systems for 0-deg and 45-deg impact
trajectories, respectively. Also shown in these figures are the results of experimental tests with regard to whether a
pressure wall perforation was in the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole.
As can be seen from Figures 32a,b, for the BLC wall system, there exist projectile diameter-impact velocity
combinations that are above the ballistic limit curve but below the petalling limit curve (shown as region A in Figures
32a,b). In this region, perforation of the pressure wall in a BLC wall system would result in cookie-cutter holes.
However, above the petalling limit function (region B in Figures 32a,b), the intensity of the impact loading is such
that pressure wall perforation would most likely be accompanied by petalling and cracking. We note that the scatter
in the data in Figure 32a is not new or surprising. In fact, it is consistent with the scatter in the data used to obtain
ballistic limit curves for similar multi-wall systems under similar impact conditions.
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Figure 32a,b. Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) and Petalling Limit Function (PLF) Curves for
the Baseline US Lab Cylinder (BLC) Wall System

Figure 33a,b. Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) and Petalling Limit Function (PLF) Curves for
the Enhanced US Lab Cylinder (ELC) Wall System

With regard to the ELC wall system, Figures 33a,b show that the petalling limit function is always below the
ballistic limit curve. Hence, pressure wall perforations in an ELC wall system will always be accompanied by petalling
and cracking, even at relatively low impact velocities. This is borne out by the experimental data in Figures 33a,b,
which show only petalled perforations. Thus, the model developed shows that the perforation of a spacecraft wall with
an enhanced shield will always be accompanied by petalling and cracking, while the perforations of a Whipple-type
spacecraft wall may or may not be petalled and cracked, depending on impact conditions.
Parallel to these empirical modelling efforts, we also sought to develop an analytical, first principles-based model
of hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length for a spacecraft module pressure wall that has been perforated
in an orbital debris particle impact [38]. The analytical hole diameter and crack length models were developed by
sequentially characterizing the phenomena comprising a normal impact event. These phenomena include the initial
impact, the creation and motion of a debris cloud within a multiwall system, the impact of the debris cloud on the
pressure wall, pressure wall deformation prior to crack formation, pressure wall crack initiation, propagation and
arrest, and finally, pressure wall deformation following crack initiation and growth. Two types of multi-wall systems
were considered: a Whipple-type system (where the inner wall is a multi-layer thermal insulation blanket) and an
enhanced shielding system (where the inner wall consists of several layers of Kevlar and Nextel cloth added to an
MLI blanket).
As noted previously, some perforated pressure walls holes retained their flatness and contained what may be
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called "cookie cutter holes", that is, holes with jagged edges from which pressure wall material had been simply
punched out. Others were bulged with petals and extensive cracking. The model developed, therefore, also included
the PL function described above as a means of determining, a priori, whether a pressure wall perforation would be in
the form of a petalled hole or a cookie-cutter hole. Figure 34a,b shows a graphical representation of the early (just
perforated) and late (petalled) stages of the deformation of a pressure wall plate that is impacted and perforated
impulsively.

Figure 34a,b. Graphical Representation of the Pressure Wall Deformation and Petalling Model

The table in Figure 35 shows how well the model was able to predict the hole diameter and crack length in several
impact tests for three wall configurations. Model predictions compared fairly well with experimental results, but
especially well for those tests highlighted in a red outline in Figure 33. This hole and crack length prediction model
was then extended to oblique impacts with similar results (see the table in Figure 36 below [39]).

Figure 35. Comparison of Model predictions and Experimental Results, Normal Impact

Figure 36. Comparison of Model predictions and Experimental Results, Normal Impact

Most recently [40], we updated the 1997 hole diameter and crack length equations (dubbed the S-W Model) by
making them more general and by extending them to diameters and masses significantly beyond the ballistic limit of

30

William P. Schonberg / Procedia Engineering 204 (2017) 4–42
Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2017) 000–000

27

the system being impacted (called the W-S model). A generic hole diameter-vs-projectile diameter curve is shown in
Figure 37 for a given impact velocity, trajectory obliquity, and shield system geometry. The general type of
phenomenology shown in Figure 37 is broken up into 3 regions; each region corresponds to a certain type of projectile
response and pressure wall hole growth pattern. The shape of the curve shown in each of these three regions is based
on the following considerations.
(1) Initially, the hole diameter (and the cracking) phenomena are governed by the nature of the debris cloud
loading on the module pressure wall. This case corresponds to Region I of the curve shown in Figure 37. In
Region I, the projectile is completely shattered upon impact and the degree of fragmentation increases with
increasing projectile diameter. As a result, spread of the debris cloud created by the initial impact also
increases as does the effective diameter of the hole in the pressure wall.
(2) At a certain projectile diameter (labeled D1 in Figure 37), the projectile is too large for it to be completely
shattered by the outer bumper or shielding system. Hence, for projectile diameters beyond this point (i.e. in
Region II), the amount of projectile fragmentation decreases with increasing projectile diameter as does the
spread of the debris cloud and the size of the hole in the pressure wall.
(3) In Region III (i.e. for Dp >> D2), the projectile diameter is very large when compared to the ballistic limit
diameter value, perhaps even as large as the spacing between the bumper and the pressure wall. In such cases,
the multi-wall system can be expected to act as a single thin plate. Hence, the form of that part of the curve
should be similar to that generated by single plate hole diameter equations. In this case, the pressure wall
hole diameter again increases with increasing projectile diameter.
Figures 37 and 38 present a sketch of the three-part equation (thick solid line) that we used as the basis for the WS model developed to model the response regimes as outlined above, and the implementation of the full model for the
US Lab Cylinder dual-wall system.

Figure 37. Sketch of a Three-part Hole Diameter or Crack Length Equation

We found that the predictions of the new W-S model fit the empirical data just as well as, if not better than, the
previous S-W model and that the W-S model displayed the appropriate phenomenological hole size and crack length
response characteristics as the diameter of the impacting projectile increased beyond the ballistic limit of a particular
wall system. Based on these results, we believe that the new W-S hole and crack size model encoded will improve the
fidelity of risk assessments performed for the international space station or other spacecraft with similar wall
configurations.
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Figure 38. Plot of the W-S Rear Wall Hole Diameter Prediction Model,
US Lab Cylinder Wall System, 6.5 km/s Impact, 0-deg Trajectory Obliquity

8. Uncertainly analysis
All of the studies we have performed have been heavily reliant on data, whether as the basis for empirical or semiempirical response prediction models or against which the predictions of analytical models are compared. However,
as we saw in Figures 12a,b and 26 a,b there can be quite a bit of scatter amongst high speed impact test data – it
doesn’t always fall neatly into place. This gives rise to questions regarding our certainty of whatever information we
extract from high speed impact tests and how repeatable it is, or put another way, what is the uncertainty in the results
obtained in hypervelocity impact tests? Reporting uncertainty information enables those performing MMOD risk
assessments to fold uncertainty information into those assessments, thereby putting them in perspective with the other
risk contributors. Risk predictions can also be used to help prioritize research programs to reduce the highest
contributors to risk and uncertainty first.
Initial efforts focused on assessing the repeatability of light gas gun information [41]. A review of the Phase B
and Phase C/D impact test parameters revealed that very few of the impact tests were repeated under the same impact
conditions. Thus, a traditional repeatability analysis of the phenomena involved in the response of dual-wall structures
to hypervelocity projectile impact was impossible to perform. A modified repeatability analysis was then performed
by pooling together several related groups of similar tests. This resulted in sample sizes of at 5-10 related tests per
group. Though the pooled test groups were by no means large, some sort of comparison and assessment of phenomena
repeatability became possible.
For example, one such grouping was all tests performed on dual-wall structures without MLI and with a 1.6-mmthick bumper, a 3.175-mm-thick pressure wall, and a 10.16-cm stand-off distance. Within that group, tests were then
paired according to similarity in projectile diameter, trajectory obliquity, and impact velocity. Using the test pairs and
groupings so created, a quantifiable level of repeatability for dual-wall systems tested in the NASA/MSFC light gas
gun was determined by calculating the number of test pairs within a group of tests that did or did not sustain pressure
wall perforation or rear-side spall in both tests of each test pair. The repeatability for that group of tests was then stated
as the percentage of test pairs that were in agreement with regard to pressure wall perforation or rear-side spallation.
This quantity was referred to as the repeatability index (RI) for the specific group of tests under consideration. In the
end, we found that that the perforation RI was approx. 75%. In other words, in approx. 75% of the test pairs considered,
either both walls were perforated, or both walls were not.
NASA currently uses the BUMPER code to calculate the risk of MMOD penetration for the International Space
Station (ISS), extravehicular activity (EVA) suits, and other spacecraft. While BUMPER is a powerful tool, one of its
limitations is that it provides a point estimate of MMOD risk with no assessment of its associated uncertainty. One
reason for this is that the uncertainties associated with input models underlying BUMPER are largely unknown.
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These underlying models include damage prediction / ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure
criteria definitions. In order to attempt to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the
uncertainty in these three areas must be identified. In a more recent study [42,43], we presented several possible
approaches through which uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals could be developed for the various damage
prediction (DP) and ballistic limit (BL) equations encoded within BUMPER.
The DP equations in BUMPER are curve-fits to empirical data, that is, they are the results of statistical regression
analyses of available test data. As such, uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals can readily be obtained at the
time that the regression analyses are being performed to form the DP equations. However, unlike DP equations, BL
equations are not statistically based. They are not curve-fits, but are rather simply lines of demarcation between regions
of penetration and non-penetration in regions where test data exist. In regions where test data does not exist, lines are
drawn based on assumed forms and assumed exponents of various terms. As a result, and also unlike the DP equations,
it is simply not possible to obtain uncertainty bounds and/or confidence intervals as part of the current procedure that
is used to derive the BL equations. Alternative, innovative approaches must be developed to either (i) obtain the
required uncertainty information from existing BL equations and the data on which they are based, or (ii) re-derive
the BL equations using a statistics-based approach so that uncertainty information is forthcoming out of the analyses
along with the equations themselves.
9. Debris cloud characterization
The key to conducting an accurate damage assessment of a target impacted by a high speed projectile is the use
of a robust assessment methodology. To accurately determine total target damage, a damage assessment methodology
must include the effects of discrete impacts by solid debris cloud fragments as well as impulsive loadings due to
molten and vaporous debris cloud material. As a result, the amount of debris cloud material in each of the three states
of matter must be known to accurately assess total target damage and break-up due to a high speed impact. To begin
addressing this need, a first-principles based model was developed [44] to calculate:
 the amount of material in a debris cloud created by a perforating hypervelocity impact that is solid, molten, and
vaporous;
 the debris cloud leading edge, trailing edge, center-of-mass, and expansion velocities; and,
 the angular spread of the debris cloud material.
Figure 39 shows a sketch of a debris cloud as well as characteristic velocity parameters of interest. These
quantities were calculated using conservation of mass, momentum, and energy together with equations of state for the
bumper and projectile materials.

Figure 39. Sketch of Debris Cloud with Expansion Velocities
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The shock pressures, energies, etc., in the projectile and target materials are calculated using the three onedimensional shock-jump conditions, a linear relationship between the shock wave velocity and particle velocity in
each material, and continuity of pressure and velocity at the projectile-target interface. Solving the resulting equations
simultaneously yields expressions for projectile and target particle velocities that are then used to calculate shock
velocities, pressures, internal energies, and material densities after the passage of a shock wave.
Although the shock loading of a material is an irreversible process that results in an increase of the internal energy
of the shocked material, the release of a shocked material occurs isentropically along an "isentrope" or "release
adiabat." The difference between the area under the isentrope and the energy of the shocked state is the amount of
residual energy that remains in the material and can cause the material to melt or even vaporize. To calculate the
release of the projectile and target materials from their respective shocked states, an appropriate equation-of-state is
needed for each material. To keep the analysis relatively simple, the Tillotson equation-of-state was used.
Once the residual internal energies in the shocked and released portions of the projectile and target materials are
obtained, the percentages of the various states of matter in the resulting debris cloud are estimated using fundamental
thermodynamic relationships between energy, specific heat, and temperature.
The table in Figure 40 compares the predictions of this model against numerical and empirical results obtained in
previous studies of debris cloud formation. It is evident that the model did quite well in matching previous results for
the projectile types, target characteristics and impact velocities considered.

Figure 40. Comparison of Model Predictions with Numerical and Experimental Results

Following on the success of using 1-D shock physics and elementary mechanical and thermodynamic principles
in modelling normal impact, we decided to investigate whether or not it would be possible to apply this approach to
oblique impact. Figure 41 shows a sketch of an oblique impact on a thin plate along with the parameters that
characterize the debris clouds that are created as a result of such an impact.
As can be seen from Figure 41, the number of unknowns to be determined to completely characterize the three
debris clouds is twelve: three debris cloud masses, three axial velocities, three expansion velocities, and three centerof-mass trajectories. Conservation of mass, energy, and momentum (horizontal and vertical) provide four equations,
far short of the twelve required. A shock physics-based model of the impact was developed to provide additional
information that can be used to determine these twelve quantities.
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Figure 41. Oblique High Speed Impact of a Dual-Wall Structure

Early efforts focused on attempting closed-form (or nearly closed form) solutions involving the conservation
equations and elementary shock physics equations (see, e.g. [45] and [46]). These initial efforts were not as successful
as hoped for, and required the introduction of a large number of empirical constants. In an attempt to reduce the
reliance of such approaches on empirical parameters, we endeavored to use oblique shock wave theory as a means of
directly obtaining some of the debris could velocity and trajectory parameters shown in Figure 41 [47]. Figures 42a,b
illustrate the parameterization of the various penetrating and ricochet shock waves created in the impact. Figures
43a,b,c show comparisons between the predictions of the model for the three trajectory angle and numerical and
experimental results. While the trends predicted by the model compared favorably with the experimental results, there
were some discrepancies in the actual values of the various center-of-mass trajectories. A possible reason for the
discrepancies is the assumption of pure hydrodynamic behavior in the model development.

Figure 42a,b. Oblique Shock Wave Characterizations

Figure 43a,b,c. Model Predictions, Numerical Results, and Empirical Data Comparisons
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10. Pressurize vessels
Most spacecraft have at least one pressurized vessel on board. For robotic spacecraft, it is usually a liquid
propellant tank, while for human spacecraft there are the pressurized living quarters (or modules). Although
considerable energy and effort has been expended in the study of the response of non-pressurized spacecraft
components to these kinds of impacts, relatively few studies have been conducted on the pressurized elements of such
spacecraft. Several studies were performed [48] in an effort to address several aspects of this problem, including:
 an examination of how well current BLEs predict damage that might occur in pressurized spacecraft components,
 the development of general, data-driven equations that differentiate between impact conditions that would result
in only a small hole or crack in a pressurized tank from those that would cause catastrophic tank failure, and
 the development of a first-principles based model that predicts whether or not cracking might start or a throughcrack might result under a crater in a thin plate.
10.2 Effect of internal stress fields on ballistic limit
When we first looked at whether or not the BLEs derived using unstressed plates were applicable to stressed
plates, we found that (1) for the most part, if an unstressed plate was penetrated, so was the corresponding stressed
plate (and vice versa), and (2) the size of the perforation as well as the extent of cracking did show some dependence
on the presence of the inner wall stress field [49]. However, no comparisons were made against BLE predictions since
at the time of that study NASA had not yet put forth a vetted and calibrated BLE for dual-wall systems. Such BLEs
now exist for many different types of dual- and multi-wall configurations.
In this study, the data in [49] was re-analyzed and compared against the predictions of the 1993 and 2001 NASA
BLEs for aluminum dual-wall systems (i.e. those in Refs. [50] and [51], respectively). Figure 44 shows a comparison
of 0-deg impact P / NP data against the NASA BLEs, while Figure 45 shows the comparison for 45-deg impact
obliquities.

Figure 44. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 0-deg Impacts
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From these figures we see that:
 For relatively low internal pressures, the presence of an internal stress field does not appear to have any
significant effect on whether or not the inner wall of a dual-wall configuration will be penetrated
following a hypervelocity impact.
 It is not possible to say at this time whether or not the same holds true for spacecraft components under
much higher internal pressures. The reason for this is that the primary objective of nearly all of the testing
performed with high pressure vessels or tanks was to study what would happen WHEN the tanks were
perforated, and not to determine IF they would be perforated.
 The 2001 BLE appears to perform reasonably well in predicting the P / NP response of dual-wall systems
with stressed inner walls for the particular stress state considered. However, it appears to be less
conservative than might be acceptable since it predicts as non-penetrating several impacts that did actual
penetrate the rear wall.

Figure 45. Comparisons of Test Data vs BLE Predictions, 45-deg Impacts

10.3 Tank perforation vs rupture
Of specific interest in this study was whether a high-speed impact would cause a tank to rupture (i.e. a catastrophic
failure), or if it merely would result in an entry hole or entry and exit holes. This is an important consideration in the
design of a pressurized tank – if possible, design parameters and operating conditions should be chosen such that
additional sizable debris (such as that which would be created in the event of tank rupture or catastrophic failure) are
not created as a result of an on-orbit MMOD particle impact.
The objective of the work that was performed was to develop empirically-based equations that could be used to
determine whether or not a particular set of impact parameters under a specified operation condition would result in
the rupture of the tank [48]. To render the equations as broadly applicable as possible, the operating conditions (xaxis) were parameterized as the hoop stress in the tank (normalized with respect to the ultimate stress of the tank wall
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material), and the impact conditions (y-axis) were parameterized as impact energy (normalized with respect to a
number of appropriate tank wall material properties). Figure 40 is a plot of this data for radially impacted, unshielded,
cylindrical metallic tanks, showing which tests resulted in tank rupture (red data points) and which did not (green data
points).
Also plotted in Figure 46 are some possible forms of demarcation lines between tests that did not result in tank
rupture (green data markers) and tests that did (red data markers). In Figure 40 it is evident that a linear demarcation
line would not be feasible and that an exponential line would have only limited applicability; however, a power law
curve does appear to work quite nicely.

Figure 46. Rupture / Non-Rupture Response of Radially Impacted Cylindrical Metallic Tanks
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10.4 Analytical modelling
Pressurized tank wall failure following a high-speed impact can occur in any number of ways. In the event of a
tank wall perforation, these failure mechanisms include
a. a through-hole on the front-facing tank wall (with only pitting on the inside of the rear surface),
b. a through-hole on the front and on the rear walls, or
c. so-called ‘wing cracks’ that emanate from a through-hole on either the front or rear wall (these cracks could
lead to catastrophic failure of the tank, but not necessarily).
Even if tank perforation does not occur (that is, the front wall sustains only crater damage), it is possible that a crack
might emanate from the floor of one of the deeper craters, and, under the right conditions, grows through the tank wall
until it reaches the rear surface of the front wall. While the failure modes associated with tank perforation (and
longitudinal cracks that might develop from the edges of such perforations) have been studied extensively by other
investigators, tank failure resulting from a crack forming at the floor of a deep crater or pit has not.
The latter tank failure mode (i.e. failure due to cracking without perforation) appears to be linked to the design
criteria currently used by NASA and its contractors to design pressurized tanks. As such, the objective of this study
was to develop a first-principles based model that can be used to assess the effect of penetration depth on the possibility
of a crack forming under a crater, and whether or not the crack might grow through the tank wall thickness [52]. Figure
47 highlights the various components of this model and shows the flow of the calculations performed.

Figure 47. Flow of Calculations in Cracking Formation Model

Figure 48 shows the plot obtained by running the model for Ti-6Al-4V tanks for a series of penetration depths
relative to tank wall thickness and a series of operating conditions (hoop stress relative to material yield stress). Figure
46 highlights the nominal operating condition of the SMAP satellite currently being built as well as where the results
of some experimental tests from [53] and [54] might lie when the model is run using the conditions of those tests. In
Figure 46, we see that the phenomenology evident in experimental data agrees with the predictions of the model
developed herein:
a. the tests (purple square markers) that resulted in tank wall cratering without rupture (but possibly cracking
under the crater) [53] fall in the regime where the model predicts that cracking might occur under a crater,
but not loss of pressurization, and
b. the test (teal triangle) that resulted in tank rupture [54] falls in the regime where the model predicts that the
length of the initial crack plus the plastic zone ahead of it will likely exceed the thickness of the tank wall
material under the crater.
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Figure 48. Model Predictions of Regions of Cracking and Through-Cracking for Ti-6Al-4V Tank Walls

11. Other Studies and Recent Efforts
In addition to the studies noted above, I have also been engaged in a number of other studies related to the response
of aerospace structures to high speed impact. These efforts have included an analysis of window materials impact data
[55], a study of the effect of the location of an intervening MLI blanket within a dual-wall system on the impact
response of the system [56], the use of corrugated bumpers instead of monolith bumpers [57], shock-physics-based
modelling of hole formation in a thin plate [58], effect of pressure wall material on perforation response [59], the
reliability of results obtained the simultaneously-launched multiple projectiles [60], and the design of penetration
resistant lunar habitats [61-63].
12. Concluding Thoughts
In recent years I have been fortunate to have been asked to serve on several NRC/NAE and NESC Technical
Committees. These committees have explored the resiliency of the Space Shuttle against MMOC impacts [64],
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assessed NASA’s BUMPER II computer code as its primary risk assessment tool [65], its overall MMOD program
and program elements [66], and the U.S. Air Force’s astrodynamics standards [67]. In other instances, these
committees have wrestled with technical issue faced by existing and emerging NASA programs, such as Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle [68], the International Space Station [69,70], and the new JPSS satellite. In all instances, the
committee were able to provide advice and technical assistance to NASA to help it meet is goals and objectives.
Looking back, I would say that the road has been fun, interesting, and educational. I have been fortunate to work with
many smart, talented people. I continuing to enjoy solving problems, and I hope to be able to continue working in this
area with many more such individuals for many years ahead!
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